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Daniel Pule and Others v Attorney General and Others 2017/CCZ/004 Selected 
Judgment No. 60 of 2018 
Elias C. Chipimo 
Facts  
In a case brought to determine the eligibility of President Edgar Lungu to stand as a presidential 
candidate in 2021, having served less than three years in his first term, the Constitutional Court 
determined that: ‘…the presidential tenure of office that ran from January 25, 2015 to 
September 13, 2016 and straddled two constitutional regimes, cannot be considered as a full 
term.’ 
 
In doing so, the Constitutional Court effectively backdated the application of the ‘New Clauses’ 
to a time when there was already a law governing: (a) the eligibility of a person to stand again 
as a presidential candidate who has twice been elected as president (he or she would be 
disqualified); and (b) how long a presidential term needed to be in order to count as a full term 
under the law (there was previously no minimum period, meaning prior to the 2016 amendment 
to the Constitution, a person could technically be president for less than a year and still be 
deemed to have served a full term). 
 
To give you an example of the awkwardness of this position, imagine the Constitution being 
amended to raise the qualification age for presidency to 40 years from 35. Using the logic 
above, a president who was elected at 35 years would now be deemed to be ineligible to have 
stood in the earlier election based on a law that had not existed at the time. 
 
The pre-amended Constitution clearly stated that ‘a person who has twice been elected as 
President’ could not run again for that office, while the amended Constitution states that a 
person who has ‘twice held office’ cannot run again for that office. There is no contradiction 
in these two positions – the later version simply tidies up the earlier one by making clear that 
there also has to be a swearing in. 
 
Under Zambia’s Republican Constitution, the rule about a presidential term not qualifying as 
a full term if it spanned a period of less than 3 years, first came into existence in the 2016 
amended Constitution. It arises in only two situations: (a) where the office of president falls 
vacant and the vice-president automatically takes over (e.g. if the incumbent dies); and (b) 
when an election is held because the vice-president who should take over to serve the remaining 
term is either unwilling or unable to do so. We can call these the ‘New Clauses’. 
Obviously neither of these situations was at play during the 2015 presidential election because 
these provisions were not in existence and were therefore not recognised in the law at that time. 
 
Holding 
The Court’s justification for their decision is that they felt Parliament would have intended to 
make transitional provisions to address the question of the term of the president under the pre-
amendment Constitution but simply overlooked it. As stated by the Court: 
 
…the question is what could have been the intention of the legislature on this aspect of 
the transitional arrangements for the presidential term straddling two constitutional 
regimes? Our firm view is that it could not have been the intention of the legislature not 
to provide for the period that was served and that straddled two Constitutional regimes, 
as to how it should be treated. 
 
Daniel Pule and Others v Attorney General and Others 
17 
 
In short, the Court decided that they should backdate the application of the three-year rule, even 
though it did not exist at the time of President Lungu’s first election, because of the need to 




I believe the Constitutional Court misdirected itself and I set out seven grounds to justify this 
conclusion: 
 
1. The idea that the first period served by the incumbent president straddled two Constitutional 
regimes and therefore needed some form of transitional wording is really a fabrication of a 
concept. The Court somehow managed to identify a problem that did not exist – the amended 
constitution was assented to seven months before the 2016 election. Parliament was dissolved 
in May, 2016 and the remaining time to the election was merely a caretaker phase as the official 
campaign period had already commenced and was nearing its conclusion. The president’s 
tenure was therefore coming to an end under the 2015 mandate which was adequately covered 
by the pre-amended Constitution. As we shall see later, serving even for one year constituted a 
full term under the pre-amended Constitution. 
 
2. In inserting and backdating the application of a provision that was only due to come into 
effect after the Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed, the Constitutional Court has, in 
effect, usurped the power of Parliament, abrogating the fundamental rule of separation of 
powers. They concluded that  ‘…it could not have been the intention of the legislature not to 
provide for the period that was served and that straddled two Constitutional regimes, as to how 
it should be treated,’ and then went on to decide on behalf of Parliament, which option they 
believe Parliament would have chosen. Raising the concern about intention is one thing; 
deciding which option Parliament would have taken is quite another. The Court has therefore 
planted into an earlier time, a provision in the law that Parliament did not on the face of it 
intend to come into effect until 2016 and they have done it using a set of facts that does not fit 
with the situation contemplated by the very provision they are relying on. For there to be 
justification that Parliament’s intention should be assumed by the Courts, there would have to 
be compelling reasons that doing nothing would result in injustice or unreasonableness. This 
was not the case – there would be no crisis if President Lungu was subjected to the same rule 
as his predecessors, namely that anything less than three years still constitutes a full term. 
 
3. In 2015, the president was elected under the pre-amendment Constitution and was therefore 
subject to its provisions as they existed at the time. When the amendments were made – not 
too long before the campaign period had been officially opened – the logical assumption is that 
they would apply to future elections since they referred to a system that was planned to be 
introduced by the very amendments (i.e. the system of the running mate). 
 
4. Interpreting the intention of Parliament in this way goes against the principle in law that 
unless expressly stated, law has no retrospective effect. As a general rule, law is not to be 
applied to the retrospectively unless it clearly stipulates as such. Even then, it cannot be applied 
to undermine rights that were available to someone before the new law existed. 
 
5. No transitional provision was necessary in this case if the intention (as is clearly stated in 
the amended Constitution) was to tie the three-year rule to vice-presidents taking over from an 
incumbent (or any other person doing the same because the vice-president could not or chose 
not to stand). By deciding that some form of transitional provision was necessary, the Court 
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was effectively making a decision to protect one man, President Lungu, because only he was 
affected by the decision of Parliament not to include any transitional provisions. This was not 
a new Constitution that was being presented; it was merely the same document being amended 
and unless the intention was clearly stated by the Legislature, there was no basis for the Court 
to impose an intention on Parliament. 
 
6. Under the pre-amended Constitution, there was no such thing as a partial term. If the 
incumbent died two years before the next election then a fresh election would have to be held 
and this remaining two years would be counted as a full term. The clear intention of the 
legislature under the pre-amended Constitution was not to have partial terms. By introducing 
this new issue of a partial terms of less than three years not counting as a full term, it ought to 
have been clear that this was only to apply under the new dispensation – i.e. after the amended 
Constitution came into force and not before. Parliament would not have needed to put 
transitional arrangements in place to deal with such a straightforward matter. All future 
elections would be subject to the new provisions and all prior elections would be subject to the 
old provisions. 
 
7. The facts that would need to be present to support the retrospective application of the 
minimum three-year term rule are absent: in 2015, there was no automatic process for any vice-
president to take over and the election was held, not because there was a vacancy or because 
of any incapacity of the vice-president. The election in September 2015 was held because the 
Constitution at the time required an election to be held within 90 days whenever there was a 
vacancy in the office of the president. 
 
The indisputable fact is that the person whose term of office started on 25 January 2015 did not 
ascend to the office of President because he was vice-president or as a result of an election held 
because the then vice-president could not, for any reason, assume the office of President. There 
was no need for the Constitutional Court to assume that Parliament overlooked the need for 
transitional provisions regarding the issue of term of office. In doing so, the Court has probably 
overstepped its jurisdiction and granted rights to an incumbent president that were not given to 
him by Parliament. Although in their judgment they try to distance themselves from making 
this an issue about President Lungu, their decision makes it precisely that because he is the 
only one that will acquire a new right as a result of their assumption of what they believe 
Parliament would have done if they had applied their minds to it. This is a matter that can be 
taken up in the High Court as it is not premised on the interpretation of the Constitution but is 
a jurisprudential issue concerning the separation of powers and the powers the Constitutional 
Court has given itself to address a problem that never existed in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
